In this paper, we study the dividend strategies for a shareholder with non-constant discount rate in a diffusion risk model. We assume that the dividends can only be paid at a bounded rate and restrict ourselves to Markov strategies. This is a time inconsistent control problem. The equilibrium HJB-equation is given and the verification theorem is proved for a general discount function. Considering a mixture of exponential discount functions and a pseudo-exponential discount function, we get equilibrium dividend strategies and the corresponding equilibrium value functions by solving the equilibrium HJB-equations.
Introduction
Since it was proposed by De Finetti (1957) , the optimization of dividend strategy has been investigated by many researchers under various risk models. This problem is usually phrased as the management's problem of determining the optimal timing and the size of dividend payments in the presence of bankruptcy risk. For more literature on this problem, we refer the reader to a recent survey paper by Avanzi (2009) .
In the very rich literature, a common assumption is that the discount rate is constant over time so the discount function is exponential. However, some empirical studies of human behavior suggest that the assumption of constant discount rate is unrealistic, see, e.g., Thaler (1981) , Ainslie (1992) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) . Indeed, there is experimental evidence that people are impatient about choices in the short term but are more patient when choosing between long-term alternatives. More precisely, events in the near future tend to be discounted at a higher rate than events that occur in the long run. Considering such effect, individual behavior is best described by the hyperbolic discounting (see Phelps and Pollak (1968) ), which has been extensively studied in the areas of microeconomics, macroeconomics, and behavioral finance, such as Laibson (1997) and Barro (1999) among others.
However, difficulties arise when we try to solve an optimal control problem with a non-constant discount rate by the standard dynamic programming approach. In fact, the standard optimal control techniques give rise to time inconsistent strategies, i.e, a strategy that is optimal for the initial time may be not optimal later. This is the so-called time inconsistent control problem and the classical dynamic programming principle does no longer hold. Strotz (1955) studies the time inconsistent problem within a game theoretic framework by using Nash equilibrium points. They seek the equilibrium policy as the solution of a subgame-perfect equilibrium where the players are the agent and her future selves.
Recently, there is an increasing attention in the time inconsistent control problem due to the practical applications in economics and finance. A modified HJB equation is derived in Marín-Solano and Navas (2010) which solves an optimal consumption and investment problem with the non-constant discount rate for both naive and sophisticated agents. A similar problem is also considered by another approach in Ekeland and Lazrak (2006) and Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) , which provide the precise definition of the equilibrium concept in continuous time for the first time. They characterize the equilibrium policies through the solutions of a flow of BSDEs, and they show, for a special form of the discount factor, that this BSDE reduces to a system of two ODEs which has a solution. Considering the hyperbolic discounting, Ekeland et al. (2012) studies the portfolio management problem for an investor who is allowed to consume and take out life insurance, and they characterize the equilibrium strategy by an integral equation. Following this definition of the equilibrium strategy, Björk and Murgoci (2010) studied the time-inconsistent control problem in a general Markov framework, and derived the equilibrium HJB-equation together with the verification theorem. Björk et al. (2012) studied the Markowitz's problem with state-dependent risk aversion by utilizing the equilibrium HJB-equation obtained in Björk and Murgoci (2010) .
In this paper, we study the dividend strategies for the shareholders with non-constant discount rate in a diffusion risk model. We assume that the dividends can only be paid at a bounded rate and restrict ourselves to Markov strategies. We use the equilibrium HJB-equation to solve this problem. In contrast to the papers mentioned above which consider a fixed time horizon or an infinite time horizon, in the dividend problem the ruin risk should be taken into account and the time horizon is a random variable (the time of ruin). Thus, the equilibrium HJB-equation given in this paper looks different with the one obtained in Björk and Murgoci (2010) . We first give the equilibrium HJBequation which is motivated by Yong (2012) and the verification theorem for a general discount function. Then we solve the equilibrium HJB-equation for two special non-exponential discount functions: a mixture of exponential discount function and a pseudo-exponential discount function. For more details about these discount functions, we refer the reader to Ekeland and Lazrak (2006) and Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) . Under the mixture of exponential discount function, our results show that if the bound of the dividend rate is small enough then the equilibrium strategy is to always pay the maximal dividend rate; otherwise, the equilibrium strategy is to pay the maximal dividend rate when the surplus is above a barrier and pay nothing when the surplus is below the barrier. Given some conditions, the results are similar under the pseudo-exponential discount function. These features of the equilibrium dividend strategies are similar to the optimal strategies obtained in Asmussen and Taksar (1997) which considers the exponential discounting in the diffusion risk model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The dividend problem and the definition of an equilibrium strategy are given in Section 2. The equilibrium HJB-equation and a verification theorem are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we study two cases with a mixture of exponential discount functions and a pseudo-exponential discount function.
The model
In the case of no control, the surplus process is assumed to follow
where µ, σ are positive constants and {W t } t≥0 is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion on a filtered probability space Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P satisfying the usual hypotheses. The filtration {F t } t≥0 is completed and generated by {W t } t≥0 . A dividend strategy is described by a stochastic process {l t } t≥0 . Here, l t ≥ 0 is the rate of dividend payout at time t which is assumed to be bounded by a constant M > 0. We restrict ourselves to the feedback control strategies (Markov strategies), i.e. at time t, the control l t is given by l t = π(t, x), where x is the surplus level at time t and the control law π :
When applying the control law π, we denote by {X π t } t≥0 the controlled risk process. Considering the controlled system starting from the initial time t ∈ [0, ∞), {X π s } evolves according to
be the time of ruin under the control law π. Without loss of generality, we assume that
Furthermore, h is assumed to be continuously differentiable on [0, ∞) and h (x) ≤ 0. Definition 2.1. A control law π is said to be admissible if it satisfies: 0 ≤ π(t,
We denote by Π the set of all admissible control laws.
For a given admissible control law π and an initial state (t, x) ∈ [0, ∞) × [0, ∞), we define the return function V π by
where E t,x [·] is the expectation conditioned on the event {X π t = x}. Note that for any admissible strategy π ∈ Π, we have
which means the performance functions V π (t, x) are well-defined for all admissible strategies. In classical risk theory, the optimal dividend strategy, denoted by π * , is an admissible strategy such that
However, in our settings, this optimization problem is time-inconsistent in the sense that the Bellman optimality principle fails. Similar to Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) and Björk and Murgoci (2010) , we view the entire problem as a non-cooperative game and look for Nash equilibria for the game. More specifically, we consider a game with one player for each time t, where player t can be regarded as the future incarnation of the decision maker at time t. Given state (t, x), player t will choose a control action π(t, x), and she/he wants to maximize the functional V π (t, x). In the continuous-time model, Ekeland and Lazrak (2006) and Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) give the precise definition of this equilibrium strategy for the first time. Intuitively, equilibrium strategies are the strategies such that, given that they will be implemented in the future, it is optimal to implement them right now.
Definition 2.2. Choose a control lawπ ∈ Π, a fixed l ∈ [0, M] and a fixed real number > 0. For any
we say thatπ is an equilibrium control law. And the equilibrium value function V is defined by
In the following section, we will first give the equilibrium HJB-equation for the equilibrium value function V, and then prove a verification theorem.
3 The equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation
In this section, we consider the objective function having the form
where
The following equilibrium HJB-equation is motivated by Equation (4.77) of Yong (2012) and the proof of Theorem 3.2. 
Since the equilibrium HJB-equation given in Definition 3.1 is informal, we are now giving a strict verification theorem. 
where τ n = n ∧ τπ t , n ≥ t, n = 1, 2, · · · , and Xπ is the unique solution to the SDE (2.1) with π replaced byπ and initial state (t, x), thenπ given by (3.4) is an equilibrium control law, and V given by (3.5) is the corresponding equilibrium value function.
Proof. We give the proof in two steps: 1. We show that V is the value function corresponding toπ, i.e., V(t, x) = Vπ(t, x); 2. We prove thatπ is indeed the equilibrium control law which is defined by Definition 2.2.
Step 1. With (3.4), we rewrite (3.2) as
where the operator Lπ applies to the function c(s, ·, ·). By (3.7), applying Dynkin's formula to the function c(s, ·, ·) yields that
Recalling Definition 2.1 of admissible strategies (see also (2.2)), for given s ≤ t, we have
Since c(·, ·, ·) is bounded, by (3.6), letting n → ∞ and applying dominated convergence theorem yield that
Thus, we have
Step 2. For a given l ∈ [0, M], and a fixed real number > 0, we define π by Definition 2.2. For simplicity, we denote by X the path under the control law π . Without loss of generality, we consider the case where is sufficient small such that t + < τ π t ∧ τπ t . By the definition of V π , we obtain
Hereπ(s, X s ) andπ(s, Xπ s ) are the equilibrium control processes associated with the paths of X and Xπ, respectively. According to the equation (3.9), we now consider the limitation lim →0 Vπ(t,x)−V π (t,x) in three parts separately: 1. Noting that ∞ 0 h(t)dt < ∞, l andπ are bounded and applying the dominated convergence theorem, we get
2. We rewrite the second part in the right-side of the equation (3.9) by
Applying the Itô formula, we get
3. Considering the cases with τπ t ≥ τ π t and τπ t ≤ τ π t and noting thatπ s, X s ≡ 0 for s ≥ τ π t , we have
Noting thatπ is bounded and
∞ 0 h(s)ds < ∞, by the dominated convergence theorem, we get
Therefore, we obtain
It follows from (3.3) and (3.4) that
Therefore, (3.10) and (3.11) imply that
This completes the proof.
Solutions to Two Special Cases
In this section, we try to find a solution of the equilibrium HJB-equation in Definition 3.1 for specific discount functions. First of all, we make a conjecture of equilibrium strategy for a general discount function. Since
we have
We assume that there exists a constant b ≥ 0 such that ∂c ∂x (t, t, x) ≥ 1, if 0 ≤ x < b, and ∂c ∂x (t, t, x) < 1, if x ≥ b. Thus, the equilibrium strategy is given bŷ
Then the equilibrium HJB-equation (3.2) becomes 
A Mixture of Exponential Discount Functions
Let us consider a case where the dividends are proportionally paid to N inhomogenous shareholders. In terms of inhomogenous, we mean that the shareholders have different discount rates. Then given a control law π, the return function is
where ω i > 0 satisfying N i=1 ω i = 1 is the proportion at which the dividends are paid to the shareholders, δ i > 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, are the constant discount rates of the shareholders, respectively.
In fact, a mixture of exponential discount functions is used in the above example. We consider a discount function defined by
3) where δ i > 0, and ω i > 0 satisfies N i=1 ω i = 1. We consider the following ansatz:
where the functions V i (x), i = 1, 2, · · · , N, are given by the system of ODEs
Denote by θ 1 (η, c) and −θ 2 (η, c) the positive and negative roots of the equation 1 2 σ 2 y 2 + ηy − c = 0, respectively. Then
Thus a general solution of the equation (4.5) has the form
Since V i (0) = 0, and V i (x) > 0, for all x > 0, we have C i1 = −C i2 := C i > 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N. Since we are looking for a bounded function c(·, ·, ·) (see Theorem 3.2), we have C i3 = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N. To simplify the notation, let
Now to find the value of C i , d i , i = 1, 2, · · · , N and b, we use "the principle of smooth fit" to get Therefore by denoting
we can rewrite (4.7) as for i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
8) 9) and
From (4.8) -(4.9) we can get C i and d i in the expression of b:
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. Substituting C i into (4.10), we obtain
Proof. The condition
.1 of Asmussen and
Taksar (1997), we know that
Thus,
Furthermore, we have
Therefore, the equation F(b) = 0 admits a unique solution on (0, ∞). 
(4.14)
where C i , d i , i = 1, 2, · · · , N, and b is the unique solution to the system (4.8)-(4.10).
Proof. (i) It is easy to check the function c(s, t, x) given by (4.13) and b = 0 satisfy the system of ODEs (4.2). Obviously, we have
Thus, ∂c ∂x (t, t, x) < 1, for x ≥ 0, which implies c(·, ·, ·) satisfies the equilibrium HJB-equation (3.2). (ii) Similarly, it is easy to check that b and c(·, ·, ·, ) given by (4.8)-(4.10) and (4.14) satisfy the system of ODEs (4.2). It is sufficient to show The first and second derivatives of c(s, t, x) given by (4.14) with respective to x are
and
respectively. It is easy to check that
, which implies that c(t, t, ·) is strictly increasing. Next we show that c(t, t, ·) is a concave function on [0, ∞), i.e.
. Recalling (4.4), (4.5) and (4.7), we have
Since ∂c ∂x (t, t, b) = 1, we get
which means that
Thus, we proved (4.15).
Corollary 4.3. Consider the discount function (4.3).
is an equilibrium dividend strategy, and
is the corresponding equilibrium value function. 
is the corresponding equilibrium value function. Here C i , d i , i = 1, 2, · · · , N, and b is the unique solution to the system (4.8)-(4.10).
Proof. By Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.2, it is sufficient to verify (3.6). If M ≥ µ, in both cases (i) and (ii), it is well known that P τπ t < ∞ = 1 (see, e.g. Gerber and Shiu (2006) ). Since c(s, t, 0) = 0 for all (s, t) ∈ D[0, ∞),we get (3.6). If M < µ, in both cases (i) and (ii), we have P τπ t = ∞ > 0 and
However, for any s ∈ [0, ∞) we have lim t→∞,x→∞ c(s, t, x) = 0. Thus, we still have (3.6). 
A Pseudo-Exponential Discount Function
We now consider a pseudo-exponential discount function defined as
where λ > 0, δ > 0 are parameters. We refer the reader to Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) for explanations of this discount function. To ensure h is decreasing, we assume that λ < δ. To simplify the calculations, we shall impose more conditions on λ in the following. We consider the following ansatz: 17) where V 3 (·) and V 4 (·) are given by (4.19) respectively. It is easy to check that the function c(·, ·, ·) given by (4.17)-(4.19) satisfies the system (4.2).
Recalling the situation we discussed in Subsection 4.1, the equation (4.18) has a general solution 20) where C > 0, d > 0 are two unknown constants to be determined, θ 1 (η) and −θ 2 (η) are the positive and negative roots of the equation 1 2 σ 2 y 2 + ηy − δ = 0, respectively. According to "the principle of smooth fit", we have (4.21) which yields that (4.23) where
After obtaining V 3 , solving ODE (4.19) yields that
Since V 4 (0) = 0, we have D 1 = −D 2 :=Ĉ. Also noting that B 1 + B 2 = 0, we rewrite (4.24) as
(4.26)
Applying "the principle of smooth fit", we obtain From the first two equations in (4.27), we obtain
Furthermore, using
i.e.,Ĉ
i.e.,
Puting (4.28) and (4.29) into the left-hand-side of (4.30), it can be rewritten as
and , then b = 0 and c(·, ·, ·) is given by (4.17) with
(ii) If (4.33) and (B.1) hold, then c(·, ·, ·) is given by (4.17) with 
(4.36) (i) Firstly, we show that the function V 4 defined by (4.34) is a concave function. Recalling Lemma A.1 and λ > 0, we obtain
Recalling the second equation of (4.19), we have
Thus, 
is the corresponding equilibrium value function. Here b,Ĉ, B 1 , B 3 , D 3 is the solution to (4.27). 
